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Abstract
This paper analyzes a risk averse entrepreneur's real investment decision
under incomplete markets. The entrepreneur smoothes his intertemporal con-
sumption by investing in both a risk-free asset and a risky asset, which allows
him to partially hedge against the project cash °ow risk. We show that risk
aversion lowers both the project value upon investment and the option value
of waiting to invest through the precautionary saving e®ect. Furthermore, risk
aversion delays investment since the project value is reduced more than the
option value to invest. It is also shown that although hedging can reduce the
cash °ow risk, it may have a positive or negative return e®ect, depending on the
correlation between the cash °ow risk and the market. Consequently, invest-
ment timing is not monotonic with the extent of hedging opportunity. Finally,
welfare implications of hedging are analyzed.
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Entrepreneurs play an important role in fostering innovation and economic growth
(Schumpeter (1934)). It is often suggested that an \entrepreneur" is someone who
combines upfront business investments with entrepreneurial skill to obtain the chance
of earning cash °ows. This notion ranges from inventors who create new products or
even new industries to local business people starting restaurants and retail stores.1
A common feature of entrepreneurs is that their business investments, consumption-
saving, and portfolio selection decisions are interdependent. The aim of this paper is
to provide a dynamic model to analyze this interdependence.
We model an entrepreneur's business investment decision as a real options prob-
lem. Since the seminal work of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and
Siegel (1986), the real options approach to investment under uncertainty has become
an essential part of modern economics and ¯nance. The key insights that waiting
has positive value and that the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to an
American call option on the investment opportunity have been generally accepted.
This is re°ected by the fact that many corporate ¯nance textbooks devote at least a
chapter to the real options approach (e.g. Brealey and Myers (2002)). Furthermore,
related research has been actively published in academic journals.
Although the real options approach to investment has been developed substan-
tially,2 most papers in this literature either assume that markets are complete or
decision makers are risk neutral. While either assumption serves as a natural starting
point in order for researchers to single out and focus on the option value of waiting,
1See Gentry and Hubbard (2004) for this de¯nition.
2The standard real options approach to investment has been excellently summarized in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994). Recent developments include agency (Grenadier and Wang (2004), Grenadier,
Miao and Wang (2004)), ambiguity (Miao and Wang (2004)), macroeconomic conditions (Guo, Miao,
and Morellec (2004)), industry equilibrium (Grenadier (2002), Miao (2004)), strategic interaction
(Grenadier (1996), Miltersen and Schwartz (2002)), and imperfect information (Grenadier (1999),
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) , Berk, Green, and Naik (2004)).
1both assumptions are strong and made primarily for tractability reasons. For exam-
ple, under complete markets, the physical investment opportunity must be spanned
by existing assets in the economy which requires that it be either freely traded or
replicated by other assets or portfolios. Under this assumption, one can apply the
contingent claims analysis (Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973)) to determine
the option value and investment timing. Although assuming risk neutrality and ap-
plying dynamic programming can deal with incomplete markets, it is not particularly
relevant to the vast risk averse investors in reality.
In reality, it is often the case that risk averse entrepreneurs own investment
projects and make investment decisions.3 These projects may not be freely traded or
their payo®s may not be spanned by existing assets because of liquidity restrictions or
the lack of liquid markets. These capital market imperfections may be due to moral
hazard, adverse selection, transactions costs, or contractual restrictions. As examples,
liquid markets for projects to develop new products or R&D ventures often do not
exist. Moreover, the results of these projects may be hard to predict so that the associ-
ated future cash °ows may be unrelated to the risk of the existing assets. Thus these
investment opportunities may have substantial idiosyncratic risks. Owning them
exposes entrepreneurs to these un-diversi¯able risks.4 Consequently, entrepreneurs'
lifetime well beings naturally heavily depend on the outcome of their investments
subject to un-diversi¯able idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, entrepreneurs' attitudes to-
wards risk should play an important role in determining their consumption-saving,
portfolio selection, and investment decisions.
3For example, data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances shows that the
average ownership of the entrepreneur is 81% for businesses with fewer than 500 employees. Ac-
cording to the estimates of the O±ce of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration, there
were approximately 23.7 million small businesses in the United States in 2003. Here we do not
focus on investment decisions for managers in corporate ¯rms. This is because the issues of man-
agerial compensation contracts, capital structure, and the con°ict of interest between managers and
shareholders may signi¯cantly complicate our analysis.
4See Gentry and Hubbard (2004) for empirical evidence.
2This paper provides a utility-based framework to analyze a risk averse entrepreneur's
investment decision under uncertainty and incomplete markets. Extending McDonald
and Siegel (1986), we build a model in which the entrepreneur maximizes expected
utility from consumption streams when he has a nontraded investment opportunity.
We ¯rst consider a baseline model where the entrepreneur can only trade a risk-free
asset to smooth consumption. We then study the case where the entrepreneur can
also trade a risky asset, which can be used to hedge against the cash °ow risk. This
paper contributes to the literature on the real options approach to investment by pro-
viding an analysis on how risk aversion and market incompleteness a®ect investment
timing. This paper also adds to the literature on hedging by analyzing the impact of
hedging on investment timing and welfare in an incomplete-markets environment.
According to the standard real options approach under complete markets or risk
neutrality, risk aversion does not play any role in real investement timing decision.
By contrast, we show that risk aversion delays investment in our incomplete markets
setting. The mechanism of the impact of risk aversion is manifested through the con-
sumption smoothing (precautionary saving) e®ect.5 Speci¯cally, investment generates
a stream of stochastic income and thus exposes the entrepreneur to the uninsurable
cash °ow risk. An increase in the degree of risk aversion raises precautionary savings,
thereby reducing consumption both before and after investment. Consequently, it
lowers both the project value and the option value to invest.6 We further show that
the project value is reduced more than the option value, implying that investment is
delayed.
We also show that investment timing and welfare may not be monotonic with the
5An agent is said to be precautionary, if his marginal utility is convex. Leland (1968) provides
an early contribution to precautionary saving. See Kimball (1990) for an axiomatic treatment of
precautionary saving.
6These values are interpreted as subjective values, but not market values. They are de¯ned
using the \certainty equivalent" approach in the literature on the pricing of nontraded assets (e.g.,
Svensson and Werner (1993), Hall and Murphy (2000), Kahl et al. (2003), and references therein).
See Section 2.2 for further discussions.
3extent of hedging or the correlation between the project risk and the market. This is in
sharp contrast to the conventional view that hedging reduces cash °ow risk, and hence
it should speed up investment and raise welfare. The reason is that in addition to
the preceding risk reduction e®ect, for the budget constrained entrepreneur, hedging
may result in losses of returns from the hedging asset, thereby reducing wealth and
the net gains from investment. Depending on the degree of risk aversion, riskiness of
projects, and Sharpe ratios of hedging assets, either one of the e®ects may dominate.
This happens when the project risk is positively correlated with the market since
the entrepreneur holds a short position on the hedging asset. By contrast, if the
correlation is negative, then the return e®ect is always positive since the entrepreneur
holds a long position on the hedging asset. In this case, an increase in the extent of
hedging accelerates investment and raises welfare.
Our paper relates to the voluminous consumption-saving literature, pioneered by
Friedman (1957). Consumption-saving models study how an individual smooths his
consumption over time when he is endowed with an exogenously speci¯ed stochastic
uninsurable income process. This paper is also related to the portfolio choice liter-
ature. Du±e et al. (1997) study hedging strategies when an investor is endowed
with nontraded stochastic income and maximizes expected utility from consumption
streams. Unlike these two strands of literature, in our model the stochastic income
process is endogenously determined by the entrepreneur's investment timing decision.
The paper closest to ours is Hugonnier and Morellec (2004). In contrast to our
result, Hugonnier and Morellec (2004) show that risk aversion decreases the option
value to invest, thereby speeding up investment. There are three major di®erences
between their paper and ours. First, they assume that an investor/manager maxi-
mizes expected utility from wealth at the random time of investment. They do not
consider intermediate consumption and the consumption after investment. There-
fore, they neglect the impact of risk aversion on the utility and consumption after
investment, or on the value of the project. Second, they do not study the impact
4of hedging on investment timing and welfare. Finally, they consider the role of the
market for corporate control in constraining management, while we abstract from this
consideration.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes a baseline
model in which there is no risky asset available for hedging. Section 3 analyzes a model
with hedging. Section 4 concludes. Technical details are relegated to appendices.
2 A Baseline Model
This section provides a model that allows us to develop intuition on how the en-
trepreneur's risk aversion a®ects his investment decision when markets are incom-
plete. In order to achieve this objective in a simplest possible setting, we integrate a
canonical incomplete-markets consumption-saving model with a version of irreversible
investment model µ a la McDonald and Siegel (1986).
2.1 Setup





; on which all stochastic processes are de¯ned. Here fFtgt¸0
is the augmented ¯ltration generated by the standard Brownian motion (Zt)t¸0 :
There is a single perishable consumption good (the numeraire). Let C be the space
of progressively measurable consumption processes C such that
R t
0 jCsjds < 1 for
any t ¸ 0: The entrepreneur derives utility from a consumption process (Ct)t¸0 2 C








where ¯ > 0 is the discount rate and U is an increasing and concave vNM index.
We consider the CARA speci¯cation U (c) = ¡e¡°c=°; c 2 R, where ° > 0 is the
absolution risk aversion parameter. We choose this utility speci¯cation primarily for
5its technical tractability. It is well known that this utility function rules out wealth
e®ect and hence facilitates closed form solutions.7
The entrepreneur has an investment project, which can be undertaken irreversibly,
at a time ¿ chosen by him. Investment costs I > 0 paid at the exercising time ¿.
This cost is ¯nanced from the entrepreneur's own wealth. If there is shortage, it is
¯nanced from borrowing at the constant risk-free rate r > 0: Upon investment, the
project generates continuous cash °ows (Yt)t¸¿ into the future. Assume that (Yt)t¸0
is governed by an arithmetic Brownian motion process
dYt = ®dt + ¾ dZt; Y0 given, (2)
where ® and ¾ are positive constants and Z is a standard Brownian motion. This
process implies that cash °ows may take negative values. We interpret negative cash
°ows as losses.8
The standard real options approach to investment tackles this type of optimization
problem via one of the following two methods. One method is to assume that markets
are complete in the sense that the project cash °ow can be freely traded or there is
another traded asset that can replicate the cash °ows. Then one can appeal to the
contingent claims analysis to determine the option value of investment and the option
exercise time. Alternatively, it is assumed that the entrepreneur is risk neutral and
thus maximizes the discounted value of cash °ows. A dynamic programming approach
is often used under such a setting.
Unlike the standard real options settings summarized above, the entrepreneur
in our model is neither risk neutral nor faces complete markets. Instead, the en-
7The CARA utility has been widely adopted in the literature on consumption (Caballero (1991),
Wang (2004)), asset pricing (Wang (1993)), and portfolio choice (Merton (1969), Svensson and
Werner (1993), Liu (2004)).
8Unlike the usual geometric Brownian motion process, the speci¯cation in (2) proves more conve-
nient within the present model. This is essentially due to the results for a class of exponential-a±ne
models. See Du±e (2001) on introductory treatment on a±ne models and Wang (2004) on a±ne
consumption models.
6trepreneur only has access to one ¯nancial asset. Speci¯cally, he may borrow or lend
at a constant risk-free rate r > 0. In other words, saving is the only ¯nancial invest-
ment that the entrepreneur may use to smooth his consumption over time. Given
that the cash °ows of the investment project is stochastic, markets are naturally
incomplete.
Let ¿ be the stopping time of investment and T be the set of fFtgt¸0-stopping
times. Let (Wt)t¸0 be the wealth process. Then the entrepreneur's decision problem
is to choose (¿;C) 2 T £ C so as to maximize (1) subject to the wealth dynamics
dWt = (rWt ¡ Ct)dt; 0 · t < ¿; W0 given, (3)
dWt = (rWt ¡ Ct + Yt)dt; ¿ · t; W¿ = W¿¡ ¡ I; (4)
and a transversality condition speci¯ed later. The ¯rst wealth dynamics (3) states
that wealth is accumulated from saving assuming the entrepreneur has no other in-
come during the period before investment t · ¿. The second wealth dynamics (4) de-
scribes the wealth accumulation after investment. At the instant of investment time ¿;
the entrepreneur pays investment cost I and hence wealth is lowered to W¿ = W¿¡¡I:
After investment t ¸ ¿, the entrepreneur receives income from the investment cash
°ows Yt. As usual, we interpret negative wealth as borrowing. In order to focus on
the e®ect of market incompleteness in a simplest possible setting, we do not consider
borrowing constraints or costly external ¯nancing.
2.2 Model Solution
We solve the entrepreneur's problem backward by dynamic programming. We ¯rst
consider the problem after investment has been taken place. Let J (w;y) be the
corresponding value function. By a standard argument, J (w;y) satis¯es the following
standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
¯J(w;y) = max
c2R









We next consider the case before investment. Let V (w;y) denote the correspond-
ing value function. Similarly, V (w;y) satis¯es the HJB equation
¯V (w;y) = max
c2R








V (w;y) < 1: (7)
This condition states that when the investment cash °ow goes to negative in¯nity,
the entrepreneur will never exercise the option and his value function must be ¯nite.
Next, as is standard in the optimal stopping problems, at the instant of investment,
the following value matching condition must hold
V (w;y) = J(w ¡ I;y): (8)
This equation implicitly determines an investment boundary y = y (w): Finally, be-


































Notice that the above problem is a mixed control and stopping problem, which is
generally di±cult to solve. Since our objective is to highlight the intuition on how risk
aversion a®ects investment decision, we have intentionally chosen the CARA utility
speci¯cation, because CARA utility has no wealth e®ect and permits a closed form
solution to the value functions. The functional form of value functions implies that
9See, for example, Krylov (1980), Dumas (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
8wealth can be cancelled out on the two sides of equations (8)-(10). As a result, the
investment boundary is °at, in that y (w) is independent of wealth w: This allows us
to simplify the above optimization problem substantially from a two-dimensional free
boundary problem to a one-dimensional one. We are then able to derive closed form
solutions to the consumption and investment policies up to an ODE. The following
proposition summarizes the solution.












subject to the boundary conditions
lim
y!¡1
g (y) < 1; (12)


















If g (y) > f (y)¡I for y < ¹ y; then the threshold value ¹ y partitions the state space into
an investment region f(w;y) 2 R2 : y ¸ ¹ yg and a waiting region f(w;y) 2 R2 : y < ¹ yg.
In the waiting region, the value function V (w;y) and the optimal consumption policy
c(w;y) are given by
















°r2 + g (y)
¶
: (17)
In the investment region, the value function J (w;y) and the optimal consumption

















°r2 + f (y)
¶
: (19)
Finally, the entrepreneur invests in the project the ¯rst time the process (Yt)t¸0 hits
the threshold ¹ y.
We ¯rst observe that equations (11)-(14) are similar to those obtained in the stan-
dard real options problems (e.g. McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)). Speci¯cally, one can interpret f (y) as the (subjective) value of the project
and g (y) as the (subjective) value of the option to invest. Although under incomplete
markets there is no well de¯ned market value for the nontraded investment project,
our interpretation can be justi¯ed by adopting the certainty equivalent approach in
the literature on the pricing of nontraded assets. Speci¯cally, de¯ne the (option)
value of the project as the price at which the entrepreneur is indi®erent between the
situation where he pays this price and obtains the investment (option) cash °ows and
the situation where he has no investment project. It is straightforward to calculate
the value function under the latter situation.10 Thus, comparing this function with
(18) and (16) delivers our preceding claim. Figure 1 plots the functions f and g;
which have similar shapes to those in the standard real options model.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
The biggest di®erence between our model and the standard real options model
is that both the project value f and the option value g depend on not only the
parameters describing the asset value such as the riskless rate r; drift ® and volatility










10¾, but also the entrepreneur's risk aversion coe±cient °: This observation is important
for understanding the analysis below.
The dependence of the project value f and the option value g on risk aversion
captures precisely the fact that the entrepreneur's risk aversion matters not only for
consumption decisions, but also for investment decisions when markets are incom-
plete. We now analyze the intuition in detail. Consider ¯rst the consumption rule
after investment is made. We are able to derive an explicit solution given in (19)-(15),
to a large extent due to the CARA utility speci¯cation.11 To understand this rule, we
de¯ne human wealth h as the present discounted value of all investment cash °ows
following Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978). For our arithmetic Brownian motion

















Using the de¯nition of human wealth, we may rewrite the consumption rule given in
(19) and (15) as follows:







The ¯rst term in (21) is the annuity value of the sum of ¯nancial wealth w and human
wealth h. If this were the only term in the consumption rule, then the consumption
rule would correspond to Friedman's seminal permanent-income hypothesis and the
implied consumption is a martingale (Hall (1978)). This is the core of consumption
smoothing if the agent does not have any precautionary motive and if his subjective
discount rate is equal to the riskless rate. The second term in (21) incorporates the
agent's preference for intertemporal consumption arising solely from the di®erential
between his subjective discount rate and the interest rate.
Most importantly, the third term in (21) captures the precautionary saving motive,
which is induced by the cash °ow risk after investment is made. It is increasing in
11This consumption rule is obtained in discrete time by Caballero (1991) and extended to more
general income processes allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity of income by Wang (2004).
11risk aversion ° and volatility ¾ of the cash °ow.12 The precautionary saving lowers
the consumption after investment, and hence lowers the project value f:
Turn to the consumption rule before investment given in (17). It admits a similar
interpretation. However, we do not have a closed form solution for g because of
the presence of the last nonlinear term in (11): Intuitively, this term re°ects the
precautionary saving e®ect. It also lowers the option value g: If the entrepreneur
obtained a cash stock at the instant of investment and did not obtain any cash °ows
in the future, then the decreased option value g would speed up investment. This is
actually the main reason leading to the result in Hugonnier and Morellec (2004).
Observe that the entrepreneur's consumption is in°uenced by the cash °ow y;
even though he does not actually receive any cash °ows before investment. This is
because the entrepreneur is a forward-looking agent. Although he does not receive
any income from y before investment, he rationally anticipates that the evolution
of the future cash °ow attainable upon his investing is relevant for his consumption
decision making even before investment. This idea is at the core of permanent-income
hypothesis. Alternatively, we may view that the agent uses saving to partially hedge
against changes in his investment opportunity set, the \future" cash °ow process in
our setting. This interpretation leads us to link to the enormous portfolio choice
literature pioneered by Merton (1969).
Finally, notice that the investment threshold ¹ y is independent of the discount rate
¯: This is because it has no impact on the project value f and the option value g
12More precisely, it is the third derivative of utility function that matters for our analysis. That
is, the convex marginal utility gives rise to precautionary saving motive (Kimball (1990)) and
thus a®ects investment timing decisions. For CARA utility, the coe±cient of absolute prudence
¡u000=u00, which measures the precautionary motive, is equal to the coe±cient of absolute risk aver-
sion ¡u00=u0 = °. For CRRA utility, precautionary saving is also positively related to the constant
risk aversion coe±cient. The classic example that di®erentiates risk aversion from precautionary
saving is quadratic utility. An agent with quadratic utility is risk averse, but has no precautionary
motive (the marginal utility is linear, not strictly convex.) The investment timing decision for an
entrepreneur with quadratic utility will thus not be a®ected by his risk aversion. Quadratic utility
is viewed by economists as an implausible utility speci¯cation because it implies increasing absolute
risk aversion, inconsistent with empirical evidence.
12given our CARA speci¯cation. Consequently, in our simulations below, we always set
¯ = r:
Before delving into the details on the e®ect of risk aversion on investment timing,
we ¯rst sketch out a simple case in which there is no cash °ow risk. We de¯ne the








The following proposition summarizes the relation between the utility-maximizing
investment policy and the value-maximizing investment policy when cash °ow is de-
terministic.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the investment cash °ow process (Yt)t¸0 is deterministic
and that the entrepreneur can only trade a riskless asset, then the entrepreneur invests
when the cash °ow reaches a trigger value ¹ y0 = rI; which is the same as the value-
maximizing policy. Furthermore, this result holds true for any strictly increasing
utility function U.
This result is intuitive since risk aversion should not matter in the absence of
uncertainty. The entrepreneur's utility maximization can be decomposed into two
stages: (i) choose the investment policy to maximize the net present value of invest-
ment (22); and then (ii) ¯nance consumption out of the maximum attainable total
wealth, the sum of initial wealth and the net present value of investment.
When there is cash °ow risk, the above result does not hold true generally. Under
incomplete markets, the value maximizing policy is not well de¯ned because there are
multiple stochastic discount factors (state prices) and the computation of the market
value of cash °ows depend on a particular state price. When markets are complete,
there is a unique state price. In this case, Proposition 4 below provides a similar
result to Proposition 2. The intuition is also similar.
132.3 Risk Aversion and Investment Timing
When there is cash °ow risk and markets are incomplete, risk aversion plays an
important role in determining investment timing. Because there is no analytical
solution to the free boundary problem (11)-(14), we resort to numerical simulations.
To this end, baseline parameter values must be assigned. We set the risk-free rate
r = 2% and the discount rate ¯ = r = 2%: We consider a project with I = 10; Y0 = 0;
® = 0:1; and ¾ = 0:1: We leave the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion ° as a free
parameter since its consensus estimate is not available in the literature.
Figure 2 plots the investment threshold as a function of the volatility ¾ and risk
aversion parameter °. As is well known in the real options models of investment, the
investment threshold increases with the cash °ow volatility. However, here the mech-
anism is di®erent from the standard one, which states that the increased volatility
raises the option value of waiting. Within the present model, there is an important
consumption smoothing (precautionary saving) e®ect. Speci¯cally, an increase in the
cash °ow volatility raises the precautionary saving motive, thereby reducing the value
of the project f (as seen from the last term in (15)). Moreover, it lowers the option
value of waiting g (as seen from the last term in (11)); thereby mitigating the positive
option e®ect. Simulations reveal that the former e®ect dominates. This is illustrated
in Figure 3, which plots the changes of the functions f and g when volatility ¾ is
increased from 5% to 30%. This ¯gure also reveals that the negative precautionary
saving e®ect dominates the option e®ect so that g shifts down.
Figure 2 also shows that the impact of volatility becomes larger for higher values
of the risk aversion parameter. For example, for ° = 0:1; when ¾ is increased from
5% to 30%, the investment threshold increases from 0.2125 to 0.6472, which implies
that investment is delayed by 4.3 years on average.13 This also implies that the
investment probability within 5 years is lowered by 39%. By contrast, for ° = 1;
13The average hitting time for the process (Yt)t¸0 between two points y and z is given by jy¡zj=®.
14when ¾ is increased from 5% to 30%, the investment threshold increases from 0.2128
to 1.1655, which implies that investment is delayed by 9.5 years on average and the
investment probability within 5 years is lowered by 74%.
[Insert Figures 2-3]
Turn to the impact of changes in the degree of risk aversion. Importantly, Figure 2
reveals that the investment threshold increases with the degree of risk aversion. That
is, risk aversion delays investment. The intuition behind the impact of risk aversion
is related to the discussion following Proposition 1. Recall that we interpret f as the
value of the project and g as the option value to invest. Figure 4 plots the changes
of the functions f and g when risk aversion ° is increased from 0.1 to 1. When °
is increased, the precautionary saving rises. This lowers consumption and hence the
project value f: In the mean time, due to precautionary saving, consumption before
investment also decreases and hence the option value g falls. Simulation results reveal
that the former e®ect dominates the latter so that the entrepreneur delays investment.
This dominance is intuitive since the entrepreneur does not bear directly cash °ow
risk before investment is actually taken place. Therefore, the precautionary saving
e®ect before investment is not as strong as that after investment.
[Insert Figure 4]
However, for low volatilities, the response of the investment threshold is quite
small. This is intuitive since when risk is low, risk aversion should not play a sig-
ni¯cant role. By contrast, when volatility is high, the investment threshold varies
signi¯cantly with the degree of risk aversion. For example, for ¾ = 10%; when ° is
























where ©(¢) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
15increased from 0.1 to 1, the investment threshold increases from 0.2500 to 0.2548,
which implies that investment is delayed by only 18 days (0.05 years) and the invest-
ment probability within 5 years is lowered by 0.4%. By contrast, for ¾ = 30%; when
° is increased from 0.1 to 1, the investment threshold increases from 0.6472 to 1.1655,
which implies that investment is delayed by 5.2 years and the investment probability
within 5 years is lowered by 35%.
3 Hedging and Investment
So far, we have assumed that the entrepreneur can trade a riskless asset only to
smooth consumption and diversify cash °ow risk. This is clearly unrealistic since in
reality entrepreneurs can trade ¯nancial assets to hedge against cash °ow risk. In
this section, we study the implications of hedging.
3.1 Setup
Assume that the entrepreneur can trade a risky asset to hedge against the cash °ow
risk, in addition to the risk-free asset. One can think of this asset as a futures contract
or a market portfolio. Let Pt denote the risky asset's price at date t: Let its returns
be governed by the process
dPt=Pt = ¹edt + ¾edBt; (23)
where ¹e and ¾e are positive constants, and B is a standard Brownian motion corre-





Let ½ 2 [¡1;1] be the correlation coe±cient. Here the ¯ltration fFtgt¸0 is generated
by the Brownian motions Z and B:
One can alternatively rewrite (2), the cash °ow generated from investment as





16where B and B1 are two independent standard Brownian motions. One can think
of B as the Brownian motion describing the market risk and B1 as the Brownian
motion describing the idiosyncratic project risk. The market risk can be diversi¯ed
away, while the idiosyncratic risk may be not. The correlation ½ describes the extent
to which the riskiness of the project is correlated with the market.
Let ¼t be the dollar amount invested in the risky asset at time t. A trading strategy






for any T > 0: Denote by A the set of all admissible trading strategies.
The entrepreneur's problem is to choose consumption, portfolio and investment
timing (C;¼;¿) 2 C £ A £ T so as to maximize (1) subject to the wealth dynamics:
dWt = [rWt + ¼t (¹e ¡ r) ¡ Ct]dt + ¼t¾edBt; 0 · t < ¿; W0 given, (25)
dWt = [rWt + ¼t (¹e ¡ r) + Yt ¡ Ct]dt + ¼t¾edBt; ¿ · t; W¿ = W¿¡ ¡ I: (26)
The wealth dynamics (25)-(26) admit an interpretation similar to that for (3)-(4).
The di®erence is that here the entrepreneur can invest ¼t dollars in the risky hedging
asset, and thus a®ects the drift and volatility of wealth accordingly.
3.2 Model Solution
Similar to our solution methodology in Section 2.2, we solve the entrepreneur's prob-
lem backward by dynamic programming. The following proposition characterizes the
solution.
Proposition 3 De¯ne the Sharpe ratio ´ = (¹e ¡ r)=¾e: Let (g;y¤) be the solution
to the free boundary problem














17subject to the boundary conditions
lim
y!¡1
g (y) < 1; (28)
g(y
¤) = f(y

























If g (y) > f (y)¡I for y < ¹ y; then the threshold value y¤ partitions the state space into
an investment region f(w;y) 2 R2 : y ¸ y¤g and a waiting region f(w;y) 2 R2 : y < y¤g.
In the waiting region, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules are given by
c
¤ (w;y) = r
µ
w +
¯ ¡ r + ´2=2














In the investment region, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules are given by
c
¤ (w;y) = r
µ
w +
¯ ¡ r + ´2=2













Finally, the entrepreneur invests in the project the ¯rst time the process (Yt)t¸0 hits
the threshold y¤.
Much intuition behind this proposition is similar to that described in Section 2.
Speci¯cally, one can think of the investment problem as an option exercise problem
where the underlying project value is given by f (y) and the option value is given
by g (y): Both f and g depend on model parameters related to asset value and
preferences. Unlike the model in Section 2, f and g also depend on the hedging
18asset's Sharpe ratio ´ and the correlation coe±cient ½. Note that the investment
threshold y¤ is independent of the discount rate ¯, same as in Section 2. In addition,
comparing the free boundary problem (27)-(30) with (11)-(14), one can see that the
investment threshold y¤ when ½ = 0 is the same as y: The intuition is as follows.
While the new risky asset allows the agent to take advantage of the expected excess
returns, it does not o®er any hedging bene¯ts. While the entrepreneur enjoys the
same gains in expected excess returns before and after investment, his cash °ow risk
remains the same with or without the risky asset (whose correlation is zero with cash
°ow Y . As a result, the investment timing strategy remains the same as the one
studied in Section 2.
The key new element of the model in this section is that the entrepreneur can also
invest in a risky hedging asset to diversify cash °ow risk. The demand for this asset
is given in (33) and (35). The ¯rst term in these expressions represents the standard
mean-variance e±cient rule (Merton (1969)). The second term represents the hedging
demand. In order to minimize the variation of consumption, the entrepreneur holds
a short position on the risky asset if ½ > 0; and a long position if ½ < 0.
The conventional wisdom is that hedging can reduce investment risk. In our
model, this e®ect is manifested in the consumption rules before and after investment.
Consider ¯rst the consumption rule after investment, particularly the last term in
(31). After investment, cash °ows bring income °uctuations. This induces a precau-
tionary saving term °¾2 (1 ¡ ½2)=(2r2). Compared to the model without hedging,
the precautionary saving term is lowered by ½2°¾2=(2r2): When markets are com-
plete (½ = 1); investment risk can be perfectly diversi¯ed and hence the precautionary
saving term disappears.
On the other hand, there is another important return e®ect of hedging. Since the
entrepreneur holds a short position on the risky asset when ½ > 0; the entrepreneur
loses returns from the hedging asset and hence wealth. This causes consumption to
decrease by an amount of ´¾½=r2 in (31). Depending on parameter values, hedging
19may increase or decrease consumption and utility after investment. By contrast, when
½ < 0; the entrepreneur holds a long position on the risky asset. The return e®ect is
always positive, thereby enhancing wealth and consumption.
Hedging has a similar e®ect on the consumption rule before investment. In par-
ticular, one can interpret the last term in (27) as a consumption smoothing (pre-
cautionary saving) e®ect. One can also interpret the term ¡½´¾g0 (y) as the return
e®ect.
Because of the presence of hedging opportunities, the extent of hedging measured
by ½ and the risk characteristic of the hedging asset measured by ´ are important
determinants of investment timing. Before turning to the detailed analysis of hedging
e®ect on investment timing, we ¯rst brie°y sketch out the investment timing decision
under complete markets.
When markets are complete (½ = §1); we can derive an explicit solution to the
free boundary problem (27)-(30). Here, we present the solution for ½ = 1 only.14
We shall compare it with the value-maximizing policy de¯ned as the solution to the
following problem












where (»t)t¸0 is the unique state price density process (»t)t¸0 satisfying ¡d»t=»t =
rdt + ´dZt; »0 = 1: We summarize the relation in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let ½ = 1: Then the investment threshold y¤, the option value to
invest g; and the hedging demand before investment ¦(w;y) are respectively given by
y












14When the project cash °ow is perfectly negatively correlated with the hedging asset (½ = ¡1),
a similar analysis applies.
20where ¸ = ¡(® ¡ ´¾)=¾2 +
q
(® ¡ ´¾)
2 + 2¾2r=¾2 > 0: This utility maximizing
policy is the same as the value-maximizing policy for any strictly increasing utility U:
This proposition demonstrates that when markets are complete, the subjective
option value to invest g (y) is identical to the market option value F (y): In addition,
the investment threshold given in (37) is independent of preference parameters. This
is consistent with the general principle that the option value and exercise trigger are
independent of preferences if markets are complete (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
Indeed, since markets are complete, we can apply the martingale method to rewrite
the dynamic budget constraint as a static one, using the unique state price density.15
The entrepreneur's decision problem can then be formulated as a two-stage problem
as in the deterministic case described in Section 2.2: (i) choose an investment policy
to maximize the option value (36) so that total wealth is maximized; (ii) choose
optimal consumption given this total wealth.
3.3 Implications for Investment Timing
We now turn to the general case where markets are incomplete. We analyze the
important question of how investment timing is a®ected by uncertainty, risk aversion
and hedging opportunities. We use parameter values in Section 2.3 as baseline values.
In addition, we set the Sharpe ratio ´ = 0:3: For example, this corresponds to a risk
premium of 6% and a volatility of 20%. Finally, we treat the risk aversion parameter
° and correlation ½ as free parameters.
Cash Flow Risk Consider ¯rst the impact of changes in the cash °ow volatility ¾:
Figures 5b, d, f plot the investment threshold as a function of ¾ for the case of positive
correlation ½ > 0 and for various values of the risk aversion parameter °;correlation
15See Cox and Huang (1989), and Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve (1987) on martingale methods.
Du±e (2001) provides a textbook treatment.
21½; and Sharpe ratio ´: Figures 6b, d, f plot the same function for the case of negative
correlation ½ < 0: These ¯gures reveals that the investment threshold increases with
volatility ¾; as in standard models: Importantly, the impact of volatility is sensitive
to the values of °; ½; and ´. As in the model in Section 2, it is intuitive that, under
incomplete markets, the impact of volatility should be larger for more risk averse
entrepreneurs. Surprisingly, we also ¯nd that the impact of volatility is quite di®erent
for ½ > 0 than for ½ < 0. Speci¯cally, Figure 6b reveals that when the project cash
°ows are negatively correlated to the hedging asset, the impact of the project risk
is smaller if the extent of hedging is higher (i.e., j½j is bigger). By contrast, Figure
5b indicates an opposite result, implying that hedging destabilizes investment timing
when the project cash °ows are positively correlated with the hedging asset.
The above sensitivity is in sharp contrast to the standard result under complete
markets or risk neutrality, which is explicitly stated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994,
p.153):
\Investment is highly sensitive to volatility in project values, irrespec-
tive of entrepreneurs' or managers' risk preferences, and irrespective of the
extent to which the riskiness of V [the project value] is correlated with
the market."
The intuition behind this di®erence is similar to that described in Section 2.3.
Speci¯cally, under incomplete markets, an increase in ¾ has the precautionary saving
and option e®ects. In addition, there is an extra return e®ect. The return e®ect is
positive for ½ < 0 and negative for ½ > 0: These e®ects in°uence both the project
value f and the option value to invest g. Furthermore, the magnitude of changes of
f and g depends on the values of parameters °; ½; and ´:
[Insert Figures 5-6]
22Risk Aversion Consider next the impact of changes in the coe±cient of absolute
risk aversion °: Figures 5c-e and Figures 6c-e plot the investment threshold as a func-
tion of risk aversion ° for various levels of volatility ¾; correlation ½; and Sharpe ratio
´: These ¯gures reveal that, when markets are incomplete, the investment threshold
increases with the degree of risk aversion. The intuition behind this result is similar
to that in Section 2. When the entrepreneur is more averse to the cash °ow risk, to
smooth consumption over time, he saves more for precautionary motive. This lowers
consumption, thereby reducing the project value f and the option value g. Simula-
tion results reveal that the former e®ect dominates. Consequently, the entrepreneur
prefers to delay investment. The preceding ¯gures also reveal that the impact of risk
aversion is quite large for high values of ¾ and low values of j½j. This is intuitive since
risk aversion should not matter much if risk is low or if the ¯nancial markets are close
to be complete.
Correlation Turn to the impact of changes in the correlation coe±cient ½: The
correlation between the hedging asset and the investment cash °ow provides a measure
of the extent of hedging, or the extent to which the project risk is correlated with
the market. When ½ = §1; the cash °ow risk is hedged perfectly. This corresponds
to the case of complete markets. When ½ = 0; the cash °ow risk cannot be hedged.
This corresponds to the model in Section 2.
The impact of changes in correlation depends on whether the correlation takes
positive or negative values. Figures 5a-c plot the investment threshold as a function
of ½ ¸ 0 for various values of volatility ¾; risk aversion °; and Sharpe ratio ´: These
¯gures reveal that the investment threshold increases with ½ for low risk aversion °;
low volatility ¾; and high Sharpe ratio ´. This result is in contrast to the conventional
view that hedging should speed up investment because of reduced risk exposure.
Surprisingly, these ¯gures also indicate that the investment threshold ¯rst increases
and then decreases with ½ > 0 for high risk aversion °; high volatility ¾ and low Sharpe
23ratio ´. In particular, investment timing is not monotonic with the incompleteness
of markets. The top panel of Figure 7 illustrates the impact of the increase of ½ from
0.3 to 1: It reveals that the negative return e®ect dominates so that investment is
delayed.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
The intuition behind the above result is related to the discussion following Propo-
sition 3. Speci¯cally, on the one hand, an increase in ½ > 0 reduces the entrepreneur's
exposure to the cash °ow risk. The reduced risk exposure lowers the precautionary
saving and raises consumption, thereby raising the project value f and the option
value to invest g. On the other hand, an increase in ½ > 0 raises the short position on
the hedging asset (see (35) and (33)). The increased short position results in losses of
returns from the hedging asset and reduces wealth, thereby lowering the project value
f and the option value to invest g. The overall e®ect of the impact of an increase
in ½ > 0 depends on these two opposite e®ects and the magnitude of changes in f
and g: Consequently, investment timing is not monotonic with the degree of hedging
when the hedging asset and the project cash °ows are positively correlated.
We now turn to the case where the hedging asset and the cash °ows are negatively
correlated, ½ < 0. Figures 6a-c plot the impact of correlation for this case. These
¯gures reveal that, in contrast to the positive correlation case, the investment thresh-
old decreases with the extent of hedging (i.e., j½j). This is because the entrepreneur
holds a long position on the hedging asset and hence hedging has a positive return ef-
fect. Consequently, as j½j increases, the entrepreneur bene¯ts more from investment,
thereby preferring to invest earlier. This is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure
7.
Sharpe Ratio We ¯nally analyze the impact of changes in the Sharpe ratio ´,
which measures the market price of risk of the hedging asset. Panels a, e and f in
24Figures 5-6 plot the investment threshold for various values of ¾;°; and ½: These
¯gures reveal that the impact of Sharpe ratio depends crucially on the sign of ½: In
particular, when ½ > 0; the investment threshold increases with the Sharpe ratio ´;
implying that using hedging assets with a high market price of risk delays investment.
By contrast, when ½ < 0; an opposite result follows.
Again, the intuition behind the above result is related to the discussion following
Proposition 3. When ½ > 0; hedging has a negative return e®ect. In particular, an
increase in ´ results in losses of returns from the hedging asset and reduces wealth,
thereby reducing the project value f and the option value to invest g: Simulation
results show that f decreases more than g, and hence investment is delayed. By
contrast, when ½ < 0; hedging has a positive return e®ect and hence leads to the
opposite result.
3.4 Welfare Implications of Hedging
It is clear that with an additional hedging asset available for trade, the entrepreneur
is always better o® compared with the case where the risk-free asset is the only
¯nancial investment opportunity. Consequently, to examine the welfare implications
of hedging, we assume that the entrepreneur always has the opportunity to invest
in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset as well. A risky asset is characterized by its
Sharpe ratio and the extent to which it is correlated with the cash °ow risk. We
ask the following question: What kind of risky asset should the entrepreneur choose
to hedge against the cash °ow risk? The common intuition is that the entrepreneur
should invest in a risky asset which is highly correlated with the cash °ow risk. We
will show below that this intuition is not the whole story.
In order to address this issue, we compute the additional amount of wealth the
entrepreneur can be gained when he invests in a risky asset correlated with the cash
°ow risk, compared with the case where he invests in a risky asset with the same
25Sharpe ratio, but uncorrelated with the cash °ow risk. Speci¯cally, let V (w;y;½) be
the value function before investment for the model with hedging when the correlation
coe±cient is ½. Then the welfare gain x is the solution to equation: V (w;y;½) =
V (w + x;y;0): By Propositions 3, one can show that x = g (y;½)¡g (y;0): We assume
initially y = 0, which implies that the investment project has not been undertaken in
our simulations.
The welfare gains from hedging after investment can be de¯ned similarly. It follows
from Proposition 3 that these welfare gains are given by





This expression illustrates explicitly the two e®ects of hedging discussed earlier.
On the one hand, hedging reduces cash °ow risk, thereby increasing wealth by
°¾2½2=(2r2): On the other hand, hedging has a return e®ect. If the hedging asset is
negatively correlated with the cash °ows (½ < 0), then hedging increases wealth by
´¾ j½j=r2: Thus, hedging is always welfare improving if ½ < 0. Moreover, the welfare
gains increase with the cash °ow risk, Sharpe ratio and degree of risk aversion.
By contrast, if the hedging asset is positively correlated with the cash °ows (½ >
0), then hedging results in losses of returns from the hedging asset, thereby reducing
wealth by ´¾½=r2: The overall e®ect depends on parameter values. In particular, if
and only if ½ > ´=(°¾); the welfare gains increases with the extent of hedging ½:
Moreover, the gains are larger for more risk averse entrepreneurs, riskier cash °ows,
and lower Sharpe ratios of hedging assets. Surprisingly, hedging may incur welfare
losses if ½ > 0. This happens for less risk averse entrepreneurs, safer cash °ows, and
higher Sharpe ratios of hedging assets.
Hedging has similar implications for the welfare before investment. This is con-
¯rmed in Figure 8, which plots the welfare gains before investment for various pa-
rameter values:
[Insert Figure 8 Here]
264 Conclusion
The standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty typically adopts
one of the two assumptions: complete markets and risk neutrality. Motivated by many
real-world problems such as entrepreneurial investment decisions, we relax these two
assumptions and consider how market incompleteness and risk aversion a®ect a risk
averse entrepreneur's real investment decision. We show that risk aversion delays
investment. Furthermore, the impact of risk aversion is quite large if the cash °ow
risk is high or if the extent of hedging is small. We also show that the impact of the
cash °ow risk on investment is sensitive to the degree of risk aversion, Sharpe ratios
of the hedging assets, and the extent of hedging. Finally, we show that investment
timing and welfare may be not monotonic with the extent of hedging opportunity.
These results are in sharp contrast to the standard real options models under
complete markets. They have a number of empirical implications.16 For example,
when conducting empirical analysis using cross sectional data, entrepreneurial risk
aversion should be an important factor to consider. One of the most tested predic-
tions of real options theory is the investment-uncertainty relationship. Our analysis
suggests that entrepreneurial risk aversion, the extent of hedging, and Sharpe ratios
of hedging assets are important factors in°uencing this relationship. Moreover, the
characteristics of hedging assets such as Sharpe ratios and the correlation with the
cash °ow risk are important determinants of investment decisions. Finally, our anal-
ysis suggests that to maximize welfare, entrepreneurs should use a hedging strategy
to long assets negatively correlated with the project cash °ow risk. Shorting assets
positively correlated with the project cash °ow risk may lower welfare.




Proof of Proposition 1: The value function after investment is de¯ned as













subject to dWs = (rWs ¡ Cs + Ys)ds; s ¸ t: We conjecture that J takes the form
given in (18), where f(y) is a function to be determined. To solve for this function,
we use the ¯rst-order condition U0 (c) = Jw (w;y) to derive the optimal consumption
rule given in (19). Substitute it back into the HJB equation (5) to derive the ODE










It can be veri¯ed that its solution is given by (15). Moreover, it is such that the value
function satis¯es the transversality condition.
We now consider the case before investment. By the principle of optimality, the
value function V (w;y) satis¯es













subject to dWt = (rWt ¡ Ct)dt; t ¸ 0: We conjecture that V takes the form in (16),
where g(y) is a function to be determined. From the ¯rst-order condition U0(c) =
Vw (w;y); we can derive the consumption policy before investment given in (17).
Substituting it into the HJB equation (6), we can show that g (y) satis¯es the ODE
(11). Given the functional forms of the value functions, one can show that the no-
bubble condition, the value matching and smooth pasting conditions become (12)-
(14). Finally, by (18), (16) and assumption, the set
©
(w;y) 2 R





2 : y < ¹ y
ª
:
is the waiting region. Q.E.D.
28Proof of Proposition 2: When ¾ = 0; the free-boundary problem can be easily





®(y¡¹ y0); and ¹ y0 = rI. (A.4)
It is easy to show that the value maximizing investment threshold is also given by rI.










where we have imposed a no-Ponzi game assumption, limT!1 e¡rTWT = 0: Now
it is clear that for any strictly increasing utility function U; the utility maximizing
investment policy must maximize the net present value (22). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The value function after investment is de¯ned as














dWs = [rWs + ¼s (¹e ¡ r) + Ys ¡ Cs]ds + ¼s¾edBs; s ¸ t: (A.7)
By a standard argument, J (w;y) satis¯es the HJB equation
¯J (w;y) = max








Jww (w;y) + ¼¾e¾½Jwy (w;y):




= 0 must also be satis¯ed.













29where the function f is to be determined. By the ¯rst order conditions
U













one can derive the optimal consumption and portfolio policies after investment given
in (32)-(33). Substituting them back into the HJB equation (A.8), one can derive















Solving yields (31). It can be veri¯ed that this solution satis¯es the transversality
condition.
We now turn to the case before investment. By the principle of optimality, the
value function before investment V (w;y) satis¯es














dWt = [rWt + ¼t (¹e ¡ r) ¡ Ct]dt + ¼t¾edBt; t ¸ 0: (A.13)
Then V (w;y) satis¯es the following HJB equation
¯V (w;y) = max








Vww (w;y) + ¼¾e¾½Vwy (w;y):
We conjecture that the value function V takes the form












where g(y) is a function to be determined. Using the ¯rst-order conditions,
U













30one can derive the optimal consumption and portfolio policies before investment given

















Re-arranging and simplifying gives (11). As in Section 2, the boundary conditions
are given by the no-bubble, value-matching, and smooth-pasting conditions similar
to (7)-(10). Using these boundary conditions, one can derive (28)-(30). Finally, by
(A.9), (A.15) and assumption, the set
©
(w;y) 2 R





2 : y < ¹ y
ª
:
is the waiting region. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: When ½ = 1; the solution to ODE (11) is given by
g (y) = A1e
¸y + A2e
e ¸y; (A.18)
where A1 and A2 are constants to be determined, ¸ is given in the proposition, and
e ¸ = ¡(® ¡ ´¾)=¾2 ¡
q
(® ¡ ´¾)
2 + 2¾2r=¾2 < 0: Use the no-bubble condition (28)
to deduce A2 = 0: Use the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to solve for
A1 and y¤: Simple algebra delivers (37)-(38).
By (36), F (y) satis¯es ODE







The general solution is given by F (y) = Ae¸y; where A is a constant to be deter-
mined. Notice that we have used the no-bubble condition limy!¡1 F (y) < 1 to
rule out the exponential associated with the negative root. The constant A and the
value-maximizing investment threshold y¤¤ are determined by the value-matching and
31smooth-pasting conditions. To derive these conditions, observe that the market value





























Simple algebra implies that y¤¤ = y¤ and F (y) = g (y): Thus, under complete markets
the utility-maximizing investment policy is the same as the value-maximizing policy.
To show that this result holds for any strictly increasing utility function U; it suf-
¯ces to note that we can apply the martingale method to rewrite the wealth dynamics












where we have imposed the no Ponzi game assumption limT!1 E [»TWT] = 0: Q.E.D.
B Computation Method
We describe the solution method to the free boundary problem described in proposi-
tion 1. The problem described in Proposition 3 can be solved similarly. We use the
projection method implemented with collocation (Judd (1999)). We do not use the
traditional shooting method or ¯nite di®erence method because these methods are
ine±cient for our nonlinear problem and extensive simulations.
We ¯rst rewrite the second order ODE (11) as a system of ¯rst-order ODEs. Let
h(y) = g0 (y): Then (11) can be rewritten as
g




¾2 (rg (y) ¡ ®h(y)) + °rh(y)
2:
32The boundary conditions are
lim
y!¡1
g (y) = 0; (B.2)
g (y) = f (y) ¡ I; (B.3)
h(y) = 1=r: (B.4)
where (B2) is derived by the fact that when y ! ¡1; the entrepreneur never under-
takes the investment project and hence his subjective option value equals zero.
The idea of the algorithm is to ¯rst ignore the smooth-pasting condition (B4) and
then solve for a two point boundary value problem with a guessed threshold value y0.
The true value of the threshold is found by adjusting y0 so that the smooth pasting
condition (B4) is satis¯ed. Since the boundary condition (B2) is open end, we pick




= 0: We then adjust y so that
the solution is not sensitive to this value. The algorithm is outlined as follows.
Step 1. Start with a guess y0 and a preset order n:








where Ti (y) is the Chebyshev polynomial of order i, and a = (a0;a1;:::;an) and b =
(b0;b1;:::;bn) are 2n+2 constants to be determined: Substitute the above expressions
into the preceding system of ODEs and evaluate it at n roots of Tn (y): Together with
the two boundary conditions, we then have 2n + 2 equations for 2n + 2 unknowns
a = (a0;a1;:::;an) and b = (b0;b1;:::;bn): Let the solution be b a and b b:
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Figure 1: The project value f and the option value g. This ¯gure plots the
functions f and g for the model in section 2. The parameter values are set as follows:







































Figure 2: Investment threshold, risk aversion, and project volatility. This
¯gure plots the investment threshold at varying levels of risk aversion and project
volatility for the model in section 2. Other parameter values are set as ¯ = r = 2%;
® = 0:1; and I = 10























Figure 3: Impact of changes in volatility. This ¯gure plots the impact on the
investment threshold and the functions f and g for the model in section 2 when the
risk aversion parameter ¾ is increased from 5% to 30%. Other parameter values are
set as ¯ = r = 2%; ° = 1; ® = 0:1; and I = 10:

























Figure 4: Impact of changes in risk aversion. This ¯gure plots the impact
on the value function and investment threshold for the model in section 2 when the
risk aversion parameter ° increases from 1 to 2. Other parameter values are set as









































































































































































































Figure 5: Impact of parameters on investment threshold. These ¯gures plot
the investment threshold as functions of various parameters for the model in section
3 when the correlation is positive. Baseline parameter values are set as ¯ = r = 2%;









































































































































































































Figure 6: Impact of parameters on investment threshold. These ¯gures plot
the investment threshold as functions of various parameters for the model in section
3 when the correlation is negative. Baseline parameter values are set as ¯ = r = 2%;
° = 1; ® = 0:1; ¾ = 10%; ´ = 0:3; ½ = ¡0:8; and I = 10:



















































Figure 7: Impact of changes in the correlation. These ¯gures plot the changes
of functions f (y)¡I and g (y) as ½ changes. Parameter values are set as ¯ = r = 2%;

























































































Figure 8: Utility gains of hedging. These ¯gures plot the utility gains of hedging
at varying levels of parameter values. The baseline parameter values are set as ¯ =
r = 2%; ° = 1; ® = 0:1; ¾ = 10%; ´ = 0:1; and I = 10:
45